We examine a three-stage game in which duopolists face a random demand intercept. The firms first choose capacities, then decide whether to commit to share the private information they will receive about the intercept. After the private information is observed, firms choose output levels. Comparing the results to an alternative model without capacity choice or capacity constraints, we show the existence of a capacity choice stage may reverse the incentives to share information, and lead to equilibria in which information sharing occurs. We use binary uncertainty since the common linearnormal model cannot handle capacity constraints.
Introduction
We are interested in the role of capacity and capacity choice in the incentives of firms to share information about a random demand intercept. Standard information sharing models contain no capacity restrictions. In essence, capacity and output choices are made simultaneously. Our point is simple but powerful: Separation of the capacity and output choices into different stages sometimes reverses previous results on firms' incentives to share information.
To understand why the existence of a capacity choice stage may reverse the incentives to share information, it is instructive to consider first a case with capacity constraints which are exogenously set. When set at certain levels, the capacity constraints can reduce one of the profit-reducing effects of information sharing. When information is shared and both firms receive high signals, they are fairly confident that the demand intercept is large. In their resulting output choices, the capacity constraints are binding, and prevent the firms from being "too competitive" (i.e., they keep the firms closer to the collusive output). When the firms do not share information, they are less sure that the demand intercept is large when they receive a high signal, so the capacity constraint does not bind as often or with as much impact. The result is that, for certain exogenous capacity levels, information sharing becomes relatively more attractive to the firms than it would have been without the capacity constraints.
The remaining question is whether such capacities, at which the information sharing incentives are reversed, would be endogenously chosen by firms in an equilibrium. We show that the answer is sometimes, but not always, yes. We consider a multistage game: in the First
Stage, firms choose capacities; in the Second Stage, firms decide whether to share information;
in the Third Stage, firms play a Cournot game, choosing outputs given their capacity and information-sharing decisions. We focus on two types of parameter combinations in which, without capacity constraints, there is a unique equilibrium, and that equilibrium does not involve information sharing. The first combination involves equally well informed firms while the second combination involves firms with very different levels of information. In both, we
show that the existence of a capacity choice stage sometimes leads to equilibria in which information sharing occurs. We conclude that the endogenously chosen information sharing is due to the capacity choice stage.
The most commonly used model for examining information sharing about a random demand parameter includes linear marginal cost for each firm and linear demand with a random, normally-distributed intercept. The firms receive signals which are also normally distributed. To simplify the analysis, the nonnegativity constraints on quantities and prices are ignored. This is justified by the argument that, by appropriate restrictions on the parameters, at the "equilibrium," the probability with which the nonnegativity constraints are violated may be made smaller than any pre-specified, strictly positive target.
The linear-normal model cannot be applied successfully when capacities are endogenously chosen. Even if one is completely happy with the approximation argument when there are no capacity constraints, the probability of violating the capacity constraints cannot be made arbitrarily small without pre-specifying the capacities, as if they were exogenous parameters rather than endogenously determined choice variables. For some endogenously chosen capacity levels, firms will be capacity constrained with high probability, and the standard linear-normal formulas will be seriously wrong. In equilibrium, the capacity constraints will be binding with significant probability. Roughly speaking, if that were not true, the firm could decrease capacity in the First Stage, for a first-order reduction in cost, with only a minor reduction in expected revenue.
By taking strict account of the capacity and nonnegativity constraints, we introduce substantial complications into the analysis. For example, given the information structure (including the sharing or nonsharing choice), the Third Stage equilibrium in outputs will take one of several forms, depending on the capacity levels chosen in the First Stage. The capacity choices will determine the number of states in which capacity is binding, and this will lead to complicated weighted sums for the corresponding expected payoffs to use in the Second
Stage. The level of complication has motivated us to use the simplest possible structure for the uncertainty, the binary model, as well as to focus on special parameter combinations for our specific results. In our time line, capacity choices are made before information sharing decisions.
Capacity choice occurs first because we view it as a longer-run decision than the decision 4 whether to commit to information sharing. If one were to consider capacity choice as a shorter-run decision than information sharing, the first and second stages of our model would be reversed. Though the results are not reported in this paper, an analysis of this alternative time line leads to the same overall conclusion: the incentives to share information are sometimes reversed when there is a capacity choice stage. In fact, the analysis becomes somewhat simpler because, in the capacity choice stage, as capacities are changed, the information sharing decision has already been made at an earlier stage, and cannot vary with capacities.
Incentives for information sharing about a random demand intercept have been examined by Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982) , Clarke (1983) , Vives (1984) , Gal-Or (1985) , Li (1985) and many others. Jin (1992) and Raith (1996) provide more general analyses.
Several papers have shown how the incentives reverse when certain parameters of the problem change: Kirby (1988) varies the slope of the (linear) marginal cost curve; Malueg and Tsutsui (1996) , in a model with random demand slope rather than intercept, change the amount of variation in the slope. In our analysis, the incentives also change as parameters vary, but that is not our focus. Instead, our main point is that the introduction of a capacity choice stage sometimes, but not always, reverses the incentives to share information.
Section 2 contains a description of the General Model and solution procedure. The results for the Comparison Model, which is just a modification of the General Model, are contained in Section 3. Section 4 contains the results for the two special examples, one with equally-well-informed firms, and the other with firms with very different levels of information.
It also includes a brief discussion of unilateral information disclosure in the context of the second example. The details of all the results are contained in an appendix.
General Model
In this Section we set out the General Model. The actual circumstances we will analyze as well as the Comparison Model are special cases or modifications of this General
Model. Here we introduce the notation, general assumptions, and time line common to the cases of interest, and outline the solution procedure.
Two risk-neutral, expected-profit-maximizing firms, i = 1,2, produce a homogeneous product, to be sold in a single market. The market inverse demand is A -BQ where Q is the aggregate quantity produced by the two firms, B is a strictly positive constant, and A is a random variable which takes the value H with probability t and L with probability 1-t, where H > L > 0. Firms know B and the distribution of A, but they do not know the realization of A when they make their initial decisions.
With no additional information about the realization of A, firms first simultaneously and independently choose capacity levels. Both firms have the same cost of capacity, c per unit.
No additional capacity may be purchased in subsequent stages, so these capacity choices become absolute upper bounds on production.
Next, and again without any additional information about the realization of A, firms simultaneously and independently decide whether to join a group of firms who will share information among themselves. When additional information about A becomes available later, those who join the group will have access to all the information received by members of the group, while those who do not join will have access to their own information only. With just two firms, this means firms have access to only their own information unless both agree to join the group and share information.
[In a special case in which only one firm receives additional information, we will also briefly discuss information disclosure. By this we mean the informed firm, before receiving the additional information, unilaterally decides whether the other firm will also see the additional information.] We will now outline the solution procedure for the game. Firms are risk-neutral, expected-profit maximizers. Our equilibrium concept is subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
We pay careful attention to the solution at each stage so that only economically meaningful prices and quantities obtain. That is, we ensure the realized quantities and market prices are always nonnegative and capacity constraints are never exceeded.
Solving the game backwards, in the final strategic stage we need to find an equilibrium in quantities given the capacities K i , i = 1,2, and the information structure. If firms are not sharing information, then each firm chooses two output levels, one for each potential value of the signal it receives, q i H and q i L , i = 1,2. Given the value of the signal received by firm i, say s i = H, the firm knows the probability distribution over the possible realizations of the pair (true inverse demand intercept, signal received by the other firm) given s i = H. Given anticipated outputs q j H and q j L for the other firm, j, this leads to an expected value for the realization of A -
, q j L ). As long as A -Bq j is nonnegative for every realization of the pair (true inverse demand intercept, signal received by firm j), the expected profit for firm i is (E H -Bq i )q i -dq i -cK i whenever q i is less than E H /B. Taking account of the capacity constraint and the nonnegativity constraint, the corresponding best response function for firm i having seen signal
Similarly, we find the best response functions for firm i having seen signal By appropriate restrictions on the parameters, we ensure that the procedure used to solve the Third Stage for the sharing and the nonsharing cases is correct, and yields the correct profit formulas. In particular, we restrict the parameters so that e.g., for the nonsharing case,
-Bq 2 s2 is nonnegative for every possible realization of the triple (A, s 1 , s 2 ). That such conditions do not automatically hold is easily seen by considering a monopolist with p = 0.5 (so no updating of beliefs occurs), t near 1, K large, B = 1, and H very large relative to L and d. Such a monopolist would find it optimal to "ignore" the state in which the intercept is L,
When the intercept is L, L -Bq* < 0, and a very large reduction in output would be necessary to obtain a strictly positive price.
Now that we have obtained Third Stage equilibrium payoff functions with and without
information sharing, we can analyze the second strategic stage of the game. Given (K 1 , K 2 ),
Information sharing occurs if and only if both firms agree to share information. Thus there are three regions of (K 1 , 
have the same payoff for the firm that is indifferent, but not for the other firm. In general, as "boundary" in the sense that the firm whose payoff function is discontinuous at the equilibrium capacities would prefer to change capacity if information sharing could be maintained, but the (conditionally) desired change in its capacity would lead the other firm to veto information sharing. This difficulty will not arise in the equilibria we find in our special cases.
We will consider two special cases. In the first, the two firms are equally well informed and the high and low demand states are equally likely: 0.5 < p 1 = p 2 = p < 1 and t = 0.5. In the second, the first firm's signal is perfectly informative while the second firm's signal is totally uninformative: p 1 = 1 and p 2 = 0.5, with 0 < t < 1.
Comparison model
Since our point is to show how the existence of a capacity choice stage changes the incentives to share information, and leads to information sharing in equilibrium, we want to ---------------- Figure 1 Here
In the second of our special cases, with p 1 = 1 and p 2 = 0.5, for the Comparison Model the uninformed firm would like to share information but the firm that will receive the completely informative signal prefers not to share. In equilibrium, sharing does not occur.
(See the Appendix for a derivation of this result.)
Results
With capacity constraints, the analysis becomes more complicated than that in the Comparison Model. The capacity constraint might never, always, or sometimes be binding in the Third stage equilibrium.
If each firm's capacity is sufficiently large, then in the Third Stage, the capacity constraints will never be binding, and the result of the Third Stage is as in the Comparison
Model. However, as long as the cost of capacity is strictly positive, this will never occur in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game. The savings in cost of capacity for a slight reduction in capacity is a first-order effect while the reduction in revenue (net of production cost) due to the sometimes (slightly) binding capacity constraint in the Third Stage is a secondorder effect.
If each firm's capacity is sufficiently small, then in the Third Stage, the capacity constraints will always be binding, and the result of the Third Stage is production at capacity by both firms, independent of the information structure (sharing or nonsharing) and the signals received. This case will occur in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game whenever 12a Stage equilibrium, we need to check whether π 1 (K 1 *, K 2 *) ≥ π 1 (K 1 , K 2 *) for all K 1 , which typically involves comparison between several different regions (and thus formulas), and similarly, whether π 2 (K 1 *, K 2 *) ≥ π 2 (K 1 , K 2 *) for all K 2 . This process is particularly tedious for the first example, in which firms are equally well informed.
4A. First Example
Assume the firms are equally well informed, with 0.5 < p 1 = p 2 < 1 and t = 0.5. Recall When the cost of capacity is extremely low, there is no such equilibrium. In these cases, in equilibrium the firms are virtually unconstrained by capacity in the Third Stage, so the result matches that in the Comparison Model.
4B. Second Example
Assume firm 1 has perfect information (p 1 = 1) while firm 2 has no information (p 2 = 
0.5). Recall that in the Comparison

4C. Disclosure
In the context of the Second Example, it is easy to examine the impact of a capacity choice stage on the incentive to disclose information. By information disclosure we mean that in the Second Stage, each firm unilaterally decides whether the other firm will receive both signals. By deciding to disclose its information, the firm commits to reveal its information without any quid pro quo from the other firm. Also, the firm receiving the disclosure cannot commit not to use the revealed information. (A forward induction argument might be used to justify this assumption. By having disclosed its information, the disclosing firm is indicating that it will play its part in a Third Stage equilibrium in which the other firm has received both signals.) With p 2 = 0.5, firm two has no information to disclose, so its disclosure decision is irrelevant. Firm one will receive perfect information, so its disclosure decision is relevant.
How do the incentives to share information compare to the incentives to disclose information? With p 1 = 1 and p 2 = 0.5, from firm one's perspective, sharing and disclosure are identical: firm one wants to disclose if and only if it would want to share information. From firm two's perspective, sharing information is the same as having firm one disclose its information. In the Comparison Model, firm two always wanted to share information, but that 15a 
Conclusion
By comparing the results from a three-stage game of capacity choices, informationsharing decisions, and output choices, with those from a corresponding two-stage game of information-sharing decisions and output choices (without capacity choices or capacity constraints), we have shown that the existence of a capacity-choice stage may reverse the incentives to share information. Though our results are presented in the form of two special examples, they are much more robust.
The intuition is most easily understood when capacities are exogenously fixed rather than choice variables: When set at certain levels, the capacity constraints can reduce one of the profit-reducing effects of information sharing. With information sharing, when both firms receive high signals they are confident that the demand intercept is large. In their resulting output choices, the capacity constraints are binding, and prevent the firms from being "too competitive." Without information sharing, when firms receive a high signal they are less sure that the demand intercept is large. In their resulting output choices, the capacity constraint does not bind as often or with as much impact. Thus, for certain exogenous capacity levels, information sharing becomes relatively more attractive to the firms than it would have been without the capacity constraints. We have shown that such capacity levels are sometimes, but not always, endogenously chosen in the equilibria of the three-stage game.
Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs for the Second Example, Disclosure, the First Example, and the Comparison Model, in that order. The level of detail diminishes in later parts of the appendix, as the method of analysis becomes familiar.
Second Example
Most of the analysis will use p 1 = 1, p 2 = 0.5, If I is the known realization of the intercept (I=H or I=L), then the quantity equilibrium given that realization takes one of three forms:
Since each firm may be capacity constrained in neither state, in the high state, or in both states, there are nine cases, as indicated in Figure 3 .
----------------- Figure 3 Here
The expected profits in each region are as follows.
18a
Figure 3: Third Stage Sharing Equilibrium in Second Example
1.
Neither is capacity constrained.
Firm 2 is capacity constrained in the high state.
Both firms are capacity constrained in the high state.
Firm 2 is capacity constrained in both states.
Firm 2 is capacity constrained in both states while firm 1 is capacity constrained in the high state.
6. Both firms are capacity constrained in both states.
For regions 2a, 4a, and 5a, just switch the roles of the two firms in regions 2, 4, and 5
respectively.
Third Stage without information sharing:
This section solves for the Third Stage equilibrium in quantities given K 1 , K 2 , and the assumption that information will not be shared.
Firm 1 has perfect information, and chooses q 1 H and q 1 L while firm 2 gets no information from its signal, and chooses q 2 (technically, firm 2 chooses q 2 H and q 2 L , but since the signals H and L provide no information, the optimal choices will always have q 2 H = q 2 L ). Since firm 2 is either capacity constrained or not, there are only six regions, as indicated in Figure 4 . Figure 4 Here
-----------------
The Third Stage equilibrium quantities and expected profits in each region are as follows.
1.
Neither firm is capacity constrained.
Firm 1 is capacity constrained in the high state.
Firm 1 is capacity constrained in both states.
Firm 2 is capacity constrained.
Figure 4: Third Stage Nonsharing Equilibrium in Second Example
Firm 2 is capacity constrained and firm 1 is capacity constrained in the high state.
6. Both firms are always capacity constrained. Equilibrium conditional on sharing: Since we are interested in overall equilibria in which information sharing occurs, in this section we will skip the Second Stage and solve the First
Stage assuming the firms decide to share information in the Second Stage. After finding these "sharing equilibria," in the next section we will determine parameter values for which these "equilibria" are true equilibria of the actual three stage game.
Assume the firms will share information in the Second Stage independent of the capacity levels. Now consider the First Stage. Since the problem is symmetric, we will determine the optimal K 2 given K 1 only. Within each of the nine regions, for each value of K 1 , π 2 S is concave in K 2 . Ignoring the boundaries of the regions, the list below indicates the solutions to the first-order-conditions for the problem of maximizing the profit formula for π 2 S within each region with respect to K 2 (or, if the profit formula is everywhere declining in K 2 , 0 is listed as the solution).
The actual maximizer within each region is given by the solution above if that capacity level lies within the region. If not, the maximizer is the closest boundary point of the region with the same value of K 1 . Comparing the "regional maximizers" yields the best response for firm 2, K 2 (K 1 ).
Next combine the best responses, K 2 (K 1 ) and K 1 (K 2 ), to find a Nash equilibrium in capacities conditional on sharing in the Second Stage. For each value of c, there is a unique "sharing equilibrium," and it is symmetric. There are three cases.
1.
For c ≥ tH+(1-t)L-d, K 1 * = K 2 * = 0, and profit is zero.
For tH+
. Both firms are always capacity constrained.
3.
For t(H-L)>c>0, K 1 * = K 2 * = (tH-td-c)/3Bt and each firm's profit is (tH-td-c) 2 /9Bt + (1-t)(L-d) 2 /9B. Both firms are capacity constrained in the high but not the low state.
Checking whether "sharing equilibria" are true equilibria: For c ≥ t(H-L), the "equilibria" assuming nonsharing in the Second Stage are identical to those assuming sharing. The firms are always capacity constrained, and there is no interesting information-sharing question. We now turn to the case t(H-L)>c>0, and introduce the special parameter assumptions B=1, L=1,
With these parameter values, the case becomes 1-d>c>0. Given the "sharing equilibrium," which for these parameter value is K 1 * = K 2 * = ((1-
, all that remains is to show that, in the First Stage, neither firm wants to change capacity to a level at which nonsharing would be the Second Stage outcome. In Figure 3 , as c varies, these "equilibria"
trace out the diagonal of region 3. In Figure 4 , these points fall in regions 2 and 5.
First consider firm 2. Given K 1 at one of these "equilibria," varying K 2 leads to points in regions 2, 5, and possibly 6 (if c is sufficiently large, so that the K 1 value is sufficiently small) of 
2 )/36 which is positive for c/(1-d)<1, which holds here.
We must still check whether firm 1 would prefer to deviate to nonsharing regions 1, 2, or 3. When c/(1-d)>(1-t), K 2 * is too low for any point in those regions to be feasible for firm 1, so firm 1 will not deviate from the "sharing equilibrium." Now consider c/(1-d)≤(1-t), so parts of regions 1, 2, and 3 are available. For c/(1-d)>4t/3(3+t), the best K 1 from these regions is in the interior of 2, with K 1 ** = (3+t) 2 (1-c)(1-d)/2t(9-t). The corresponding profit difference At all remaining K 2 , firm 1 wants to disclose. Thus disclosure occurs in equilibrium at every (t, c/(1-d)) above the bottom boundary in Figure 2 .
First Example
The initial analysis uses p 1 = p 2 = p but allows a general t. This allows us to use the results for the Comparison Model as well. We will use the following notation:
and R = t(1-t)(2p-1). Let P S be the probability that a firm has information S. For the nonsharing case S = H or S = L, and P H = 1-p-t+2tp, P L = p+t-2tp. For the sharing case, S = HH, HL, LH, or LL, and P HH = tp 2 + (1-t)(1-p) 2 , P HL = P LH = p(1-p), P LL = t(1-p) 2 + (1-t)p 2 .
Recall the corresponding E S for firm i is the expected value for the realization of A-Bq j given information S. We impose sufficient assumptions so that, in the relevant region, both firms will always have non-zero outputs in the Third Stage equilibrium in outputs. (The conditions are noted at the end of each discussion of the Third Stage.) Thus, in the relevant region, the best response for firm i given information S is q i S = minimum{K i , (E S -d)/2B}with expected payoff, conditional on S, of (E S -d -c -BK i )K i if the firm is capacity constrained and (E S -d) 2 /4B -cK i if it is not capacity constrained. The overall expected profit is the weighted sum of these conditional expected profits, with weights P S for information S.
For the nonsharing case, for firm i ≠ j,
For the sharing case, for firm i ≠ j,
Third Stage with information sharing: We now impose the condition t = 0.5. Figure 5 indicates the regions in which the capacity constraint is binding in the Third Stage equilibrium with information sharing. For firm 1: in regions 0, 1, 2, and 3 capacity is not binding; in regions 1a, 4, 5, and 6 capacity is binding for S = HH; in regions 2a, 5a, 7, and 8 capacity is binding for S = HL, S = LH, and S = HH; in regions 3a, 6a, 8a, and 9 capacity is always binding. The situation is symmetric for firm 2 (i.e., switch the roles of regions 1a and 1 etc.).
----------------- Figure 5 Here
The Third Stage equilibrium quantities with sharing are as follows. In each region, for each S, there are three cases. If both firms are capacity constrained given S, then q i S = K i i = 1,2. If one firm, say firm 2, is capacity constrained but the other isn't, given S, then q 2 2 = K 2 and q 1 S = (E S* -d)/2B where E S* is E S evaluated at q 2 S = K 2 . If neither firm is capacity constrained given S, then q 1 S = q 2 S = X/3B where x = µ, if S = HL or S = LH, x = µ + 26a sharing or not. Thus the preferred case is that in which the firm's output differs most between S = H and S = L. Since q 2 H = q 2 L in the nonsharing case, firm 2 always prefers sharing. Since firm 2 has constant output in the nonsharing case, firm 1 is more responsive to the signal when nonsharing, and thus firm 1 always prefers nonsharing.
